In this post, we’ll profile an interesting case study that illustrates the potential dangers of owning shares within a dual class share structure where insiders benefit from owning a majority of the class with supermajority voting control. Recently, for instance, we profiled Urbana Corp, which has common shares and A shares. The public shareholders predominantly hold the more liquid but non-voting A shares whereas insiders own a majority of the voting common shares. In this dual share structure, insiders don’t own a majority of the company’s equity, but effectively control the company via owning a majority of the voting shares. Sometimes, insider supermajority voting control can add value; an insider can make decisions that may be unpopular to short-term-oriented public shareholders but beneficial for the long-term interests of the company. Other times, as in the case of MIM, supermajority voting shares by insiders can substantially destroy value for public shareholders…

